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Panelists:  SEYMOUR  SMIDT,  DONALD  L  CALVIN, 
DONALD  E.  WEEDEN,  DAVID  8.  HELLER 
SEYMOUR  SMIDT,  chairman:  Mr.  Smidt  is  professor  of  managerial 
economics  at  Cornell  University.  He  received his  A.B.  in  1948,  his 
AM.  in  economics in  1952, and his  Ph.D.  in  economics in  1954,  aU 
from  the  University  of  Chicago.  He  was  associate  director  of  the 
Institutional  Investor  Study,  and  was  principally  responsible  for  the 
volume  on  market  structure,  and  particularly  the  chapter  on  market 
making. 
DONALD L  CALVIN:  Since October  1966,  Mr.  Calvin  has  been  a 
vice  president  of  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange,  responsible  for 
government relations. In  1957 he joined the Illinois Secretary of State's 
office;  from  1959 to January  1962,  he served as  the  Illinois securities 
commissioner responsible  for  administering the  Iffinois securities law; 
from  1962  to  March  1964  he  was  with  A  C  Affyn  &  Company, 
Chicago;  and  in  1964  he  joined  the  staff  of  the  New  York  Stock 
Exchange.  He  has  been  actively  involved  with  consolidated  tape 
matters and is  a voting member of the  NYSE  in  the Consolidated Tape 
Association. 
DONALD  E.  WEEDEN:  Mr.  Weeden  is  chairman  01  the  board  of 
Weeden  and  Company,  Inc.  He  received  his  BA  from  Stanford 
University  in  1951.  He  serves as  director of both  National  Semicon-
ductor  Corporation  and  Bangert  &  Company. 
DAVID 8.  HELLER:  Currently Mr.  Hefler  is  vice  president and  Mid-
west Stock  Exchange specialist for  Ralph  W.  Davis and Company, Inc. 
He received an  A.B. from  Harvard University in  1953  and an M.B.A.  in 
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1953 to  1961.  From  I <J(, 1 to  1970, he  W<1~ VIC('  prl'~ident, treasurer 
and dileLlor and  member of the executivf'  [ommilt(>p of A.  G.  Becke; 
and Company,  Inc ..  Chicilg~l;  zmd  f~om  1970 to  1<J73  he  served  as 
president of  Ralph  W.  DaVIS  Jnd Company,  Inc. 
SMIDT:  It  i5 obvious from this morning's .discussion, and perhaps Simply 
from  the  fact  that  we  all  are  here  at  thIS  program,  that  the  securitip< 
industry is going through a period of extremely drastic change. Soms.:  of Us 
have been saying that for many years,  but  I think evt.'r),body says it now; it 
is  too obvious  to  ignore.  And  I think  it  is  also  clear that every one of the 
~ajor institutions  in  the  indus~ry and .every maj.o.r  category of  participant 
is  wondering  seriously  about  It5  survival.  I testIfIed  before the  Securities 
and  Exchange Commission yesterday and  wondered in that testimony how 
the  regional  exchanges  and  the  third  markets  would  fare-how  their 
survival would be affected by the introduction of competitive rates. Simul· 
taneously,  my  colleague  at  Cornell  [David  Ratnerl  was wondering in the 
Wall  Street  Journal  [November  19,  19741  about  the  New  York  Stock 
Exchange's survivability.  Many people seem to  think that with  competitive 
rates the small  brokerage  firms  will  have tough going. I am  worried about 
the survival of the big ones, because I think their problems of adjusting, at 
least  in  the  beginning,  are  much  greater than  those  of  smaller firms.  It is 
much  harder for a large firm to change its mind in case it does not pick the 
right  strategy  first. 
Our first  panelist this afternoon  will  be Donald Calvin of the  New  York 
Stock Exchange who,  I am sure,  shares many of these concerns about the 
central  market  system  and  who  a/so,  perhaps,  will  share  with  us  some 
additional  thoughts  and  concerns. 
CALVIN:  I was on an SEC panel with  Don Weeden on the same subject 
a month or so ago, for  which someone dreamed up a program title which I 
am  going  to adopt. The title  was,  "The Consolidated Tape:  the Beginning 
of the End or the End of the  Beginning?"  I suppose this discussion requires 
a modification of that title to "The Consolidated Tape,  the Beginning of the 
End  for the Regional  Stock  Exchanges or the  End  of  the  Beginning for the 
Regional  Stock  Exchanges." 
The consolidated tape had  its presert origins in the report of Mr. William 
McChesney  Martin  which,  as  you  may  know,  he  delivered  to  the  t!-en 
board  of governors  of the  New York  Stock  Exchange  on August  5,  1971. 
Mr. Martin had this to say in  his report, which was a rather brief one, about 
the consolidated tape: 1 
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One area  in  which the  New York Stock  Exchange  can  re-establish  leadership  is 
in  tht'  nt'velopmt'nt  of  il  single  "mmo!idated  exchange"  tape  which  is 
technologically feasible  today.  It  should  be  undertaken  immediately to  provide 
complete disclosure of material information to all investors. Price and volume for 
every transaction  in any stock listed on the  New York  Stock Exchange should be 
reported on  this  consolidated tape  at  the  time of execution regardless  of where 
the  trade  took place,  whether on  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange,  on  a regional 
exchange, in the third market, in the fourth market, or anywhere else. It is logical 
that the  New York  Stock Exchange  should initiate plans to create this tape for all 
slocks  listed  on  the  Exchange.  It  will  undoubtedly  require  Securities  and  Ex-
change Commission coordination and regulation to require complete reporting of 
the  appropriate information by each  source.  There appears to be  no reason  why 
this  consolidated  tape  cannot be  activated  by  the  middle of next  year  as  a first 
step toward full disclosure in an  integrated Central Market System. This would be 
an  appropriate time to abandon quoting prices in eighths of a dollar and adopt 
tenths  as  the  unit  of  price  changes. 
That  is  about all  he  had  to say  about the consolidated tape,  but it was 
enough to get things  moving.  It also  is  interesting to  note,  for purposes  of 
this discussion and also,  I think, from a historical standpoint, the complete 
set  of recommendations  Mr.  Martin  made  in  his  report:2 
Recommendations To  Be Implemented By The New York Stock Exchange Alone: 
1.  Reorganization  of the  New  York  Stock  Exchange. 
2.  Continuous  review  and  emphasis  on  the  financial  soundness  of  member 
firms. 
3.  Additional regulation and improvement of the role of the specialists and the 
block  positioners. 
4.  Prohibition  of  institutional  membership  and  prohibition  of member  firm 
management  of mutual  funds. 
5.  Prohibition of crediting commissions against any fee charged for investment 
advice. 
6.  Greater  use  of  modern  communication  systems. 
Recommendations  To  Be  Implemented  By  The  Congress,  The  Securities  and 
Exchange  Commission  And  The  Other  Exchanges  Either  Acting  Alone  Or  In 
Concert  With  The  New  York  Stock  Exchange: 
1.  Development of a national  exchange  system  providing a national  auction 
market  for  each  listed  security. 
2.  Consideration  of increased requirements  for entry  into the  securities  busi·· 
ness  by  broker-dealers. 
3.  Adoption  of  appropriate  segregation  requirements  with  respect  to  free-
credit  balances. 
4.  Resolution  of the  differences  which  result  in  unequal  regulation  and  the 
elimination  of the  third market,  preferably  through  the  development of a 
national  exchange  system. 306 
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5.  Additional  time  10 be given  to  till' !'xpPrilll!'nt with  Ill'gotidted ratt's iJdor. 
anv  furth!'r  chilngr'  is  n 1;H!p. 
6.  The enactment of legislation grdnting anti-trustl'Xl'mption to  t/1(>  !'xchan~(', 
coexistNlI  with  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  oversight. 
7.  A coordinateo  effort  to  eliminated  I~id stock  certific.ltl'. 
lAnd,  a5  noted  abovel 
8.  Dl'vel~ment of  a "consolidated  l'xchange"  tape. 
As  a  result  of Mr.  Martin's  recommendations,  the then chairman of thp 
New  York  Stock  Exchange,  Mr.  Ralph  DeNunzio,  followed  Mr.  Martin\ 
suggestions and scheduled meetings with other exchanges, comme~cing  in 
September  1971.  If  you  reca II  the  events  of  late  1971,  the  SEC  began 
hearings  in  October 1971  as a prelude to  its  report on the future  structure 
of the  securities  markets. 
Initially,  discussions  by  the  New  York  and  regional exchanges focused 
on  developing  a  definition  of  a  central  market  system.  Mr.  Martin  had 
suggested this; and, as  has been alluded to earlier today, the creation of a 
central  market system  also  had  been  suggested  in  the SEC's  Institutional  I 
Investor  Study  Report  in  March  1971.  Initially,  these dIscussions focused 
on  defining  a  central  market  system  because  it  was  assumed  that,  until 
there was  a  definition,  the various  exchanges  were  nut  in  a  position to 
determine whether they would support or assist  in  the adoption of such a 
system.  These  discussions  continued  throughout  the  fall  of  1971.  Essen. 
tially,  the discussions bogged down on  the question of institutional  memo 
bership.  One exchange,  the  PBW,  was  concerned  about  this  issue  and 
could not agree with the other exchanges as  to the details of membership 
in  a  central  market  system. 
The discussions then  focused on the consolidated tape.  In  Decemix~  of 
that year an  agreement was reached between the various exchanges-the 
NASD  was  not  a participant in  the meetings at  that  time--as to  a type of 
interim  disclosure which  might  be  implemented  in  a  few  weeks  through 
use of the existing Amex and  NYSE  tapes, but not through a "consolidated 
tape"  as one would expect that term to be defined. However, in  February 
1972,  this agreement also disappeared. There was  renewed emphasis by 
the regional  exchanges, and at  this point  joined by  the  NASO,  that there 
should be a fully  consolidated tape, that  is  to say,  a tape that would draw 
no  distinction between the NYSE- or Amex-listed stocks,  but rather would 
display last sale prices of all  stocks, wherever listed,  in  alphabetical order, 
and  without any identification of the market  where the trade took  place. 
The  New York Stock  Exchange,  Amex,  and others did not agree  with  this 
approach,  preferring  the  original  agreement which  provided  for  expedi· 
tious disclosure on an interim basis, while proceeding to develop a central 
market system and  ultimately a consolidated tape reporting last·sale prices Impact  of  Compo~ite Tape  307 
arising from  that system. As a result, there were a series of discussions with 
thc Securities  and  Exchange  Commi<;<;ion,  <lnd  particularlY  with  its  chair-
man,  Mr.  William  Casey,  but  no  agreements were  reached. The commis-
sion  then  named  three advisory committees, one dealing with  the  tape, of 
which  Don  Weeden  was  a  member;  another  dealing  with  the  central 
market system; and a third  dealing with  block trading and related  matters. 
The  commission  a Iso  proposed,  at  that  time,  adoption of  its  Rule  17a-14 
relating to  the consolidated Quote system,  and  Rule  17a-15  relating to  the 
consolidated tape. The emphasis was not on the consolidated Quote system 
at  that  time,  but  rather on  the consolidated tape and on  getting  a.  tape  011 
line.  The  commission  proposed  these  rules  initially,  I believe,  in  March 
1972.  In  May  1972, the  New  York  and American  exchanges questioned 
the  commission's  statutory  authority  to  adopt  the  proposed  ru les,  but 
commented on the rules favorably  to  the extent that they  proposed a plan 
under  which  a  consolidated  tape  could  be  developed.  [ssentially  there 
were two controversial elements  in  the proposed  plan:  (1)  The  user of the 
tape would  decide what  information would be  displayed on the  tape that 
he would subscribe to;  and (2) all trades would be identified on the tape by 
the  market  from  which  they  originated.  About  this  time,  the  advisory 
committee on the tape issued  its  report.  It  recommended, and the commis-
sion subsequently agreed, that all  trades from all  markets would have to be 
displayed  on the  tape,  notwithstanding what the  user  wanted  or did  not 
want.  The  commission subsequently  (fall  1975)  adopted  its  Rule  17a-15, 
which,  as  you  know,  required that a plan providing for  the dissemination 
of last-sale information be  filed.  A plan was worked out aMong the various 
exchanges  and  the  NASD  and  was  filed  with  the  SEC  in  March  1973.  At 
that  point,  the  plan  was  submitted  jointly  by  the  Midwest,  Pacific,  PBW, 
American,  and  New York  stock exchanges and  the  NASD.  In  June  1973, 
the  SEC  commented on  that  plan  and  made a  number of  material  com-
ments, sixteen in  all,  most  of which would have made material changes in 
the plan. The New York  Exchange responded to those comments in August 
1973,  in  most  cases  suggesting  responses  to  the  points  made  by  the 
commission. Ultimately, those areas of controversy were  resolved,  and the 
commission  declared  the  plan  effective  May  17,  1974. 
The  plan  provided,  as  you  probably  know,  for  two  tapes,  Network  A, 
which  is  essentially  the  NYSE  tape,  and  Network  B,  which  is  the Amex 
tape. Network A will  display all trades in  NYSE-listed stocks on the existing 
NYS[ tape,  identifying the market where a trade took place if  it  was not an 
NYSE  trade.  The  Amex  tape  would  display  trades  in  Amex-listed  stocks 
wherever  traded  and  trades  in  regional-only  listed  stocks  which  met 
eligibility standards specified  in  the  plan. The  plan  provided for  a twenty-
week  test  on  the  NYSE  tape,  to  begin  twenty  weeks  after  the  plan  was 
approved, May  17, 1973. The test did  not take place in  the twentieth week, / 
/ 
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but  was  delayed  because  of problem.s  with a  unif~rrn shorr. sale  rule  the 
SEC  had  adopted  a  few  weeks  ~arller.  The  tes.t  IS  now  !Ive;  it  began 
October 18 and is  presently operating.  The  tape displays  r~glonal trarles in 
fifteen  NYSE  stocks,  and  third-market  trJdcs  fro III,  I belreve,  five  third.  k 
t firms  that  are reporting through  the  NASD.  The  data appearing on  mar  I"  .  d  d  '.  I  d 
the current test tape are being monltore. ,an  S!a.tlstlcd _  an  other data are 
being collected.  One of the  controversial  pro~/s/ons ot  the  plan  provides 
that the test will be used to  measure user reactIon  to the tape. Also, Olle of 
the  other  reasons  for  the  test  was  that  there  is  no  feasible  way,  the 
technicians  say,  to  list  the  trades  appearing  on  .a  co~solidated tape  in 
precisely the order in which  ~hey occur.  To  deal wIth thIS  problem there is 
a two-minute  reporting  reqUIrement.  Thus,  all  trades  should be  reported 
within  two  minutes  of the  actual  sequence  in  which  they OCCurred.  This 
assumes  that  reporting  is  made  promptly  by  the  various  markets,  as 
required by the  plan.  The test is to  run for the .remaining ei~h.teen weeks of 
the  initial  twenty,  which  means that,  according to  the  Of/grnal  plan,  the 
tape would be  fully  implemented, barring some problem, after forty weeks, 
that  is,  by  February 2 J,  J  975.  As  often  happens,  il  presently appears  Ihat 
the  anticipated date may not be  met.  The Consolidated Tape ASSOCiation, 
or  the  CTA,  which  administers  the  plan,  is  working  on  a  number  of 
problems  that  have  developed  recently  with  collecting  regional  stock 
exchange and third-market trade reports.  These  problems With  the vendors 
of the  information may preclude the tape from  being fully  implemented in  February. 
The  long  and  short  of  it  is  that  this  is  Where  we  are  after  thirty-nine 
months and sixteen days from  the date of Mr.  Martin's report-at a Cost of 
a  million  and  a half dollars.  This  chronolog~' may give  you  some  inSight 
into the types of problems encountered, once a policy decision is made,  in 
the  p'actical implementation  of that  policy deciSion.  Eve'yone  tho.~ht, 
back in  the  fall  of 1971,  .hat  the  matte, of phYSically neating  ~is ~pe 
Would  be  very  simple  and could be  done expeditiously.  Mr.  Martin  said 
that  it  COuld  be  done in  a  few  months.  And this  !composite Idpel  is  a 
noncontroversial issue on which there  never was serious disagreement at a 
policy  level.  It  may  pmvide  some  insight  into  the  Woblems  and  time 
f"mes that  may  be  met  with  in  des'eloping composite quotations and a 
central market  system  Where  both  more  serious  technical  problems and 
fundamental  policy  differences  may  be  encountered. 
I have one final comment. To come back to my title.-"The Conrolidate<l 
Tape,  the Beginning of the End fm Regional Stock Exchanges 0' the End of 
the Beginning fa, Regional  Stock  Exchanges?"_one can  make an a'llU' 
ment that  the consolidated  tape may not  be  in  the best  inle,ests of the 
'egional exchanges in the long 'on. Most eve,),one has "gued-and I .hinl 
,t  has been gene,,"y accepted-that the  consolidated tape is  a faVotabl' Impact  of Composite  Tape  309 
development  for  the  regional  stock exchanges.  An  argument can also  be 
made,  however, that this may  not be the case. I think  in  this area, as  in  the 
questions of  the  competitive  rate  and  composite quotations,  the assump-
tion has  been and continues to  be that these developments will  inure to the 
benefit of the  various markets other than  the  New  York Stock  Exchange.  I 
think  that  assumption  is  open  to  question.  It  very  well  may  be that  these 
markets  will  not  really  gain  any  advantage as  a  result  of  these  develop-
ments.  but will  be  put  at  a disadvantage from  the  position they presently 
occupy. 
WEEDEN:  I agree with Don that there still  is a question as to whether the 
composite  tape  ;,vili  on  balance be good  for  the other  market  centers  or 
bad.  In  discussing  two  possible  effects  of  the  tape,  th is  fact  becomes 
obvious.  What  the composite tape means  to  the  third  market  and  to  the 
regionals can be divided into two parts:  (1) regulatory or disclosure and  (2) 
advertising  or  merchandising.  In  the  area  of  regulation,  there  are  clearly 
some problems that might  arise initially  in  displaying our transactions and 
completed  executions,  in  sequence,  with  those  taking  place at  the  same 
time on  the  New York  Stock  Exchange.  It  will  expose our activities, for  the 
first  time,  to  the  critical  scrutiny  and  evaluation  of  the  public  and  the 
broker.  They  might  find  by  watching those  transactions  that,  in  fact,  the 
other markets are not very competitive. It might  not change their pattern of 
order flow  at  all.  It  might  expose those  terrible  trades  Mr.  Martin  always 
referred  to;  the  ones that happen on  the Pacific  Exchange,  after the close, 
at  a significant  price discount from  the  last  trade  on the New  York  StocK 
Exchange,  leaving a great many public orders unexecuted at  higher prices 
in  New York.  It  might expose the terrible markups the third-market traders 
have  been  enjoying  in  the  privacy  of  their  upstairs  market  centers.  An 
indication  of  those  spreads  has,  for  the  last  two  years,  been  displayed 
through  the monthly earnings statements of Weeden & Company. As  far  as 
the  regional  stock exchanges are concerned, there are some who feel  that 
it  will  expose  to  the  world  the  fact  that  many  of  their  transactions  are 
merely  arbitrage  transactions.  The  trade  was  done  at  some  discount  or 
premium to  what the market was in  New York,  and there was immediately 
an  offsetting  trade  in  the  New  York  market  with  a  profit  of an eighth or 
maybe a quarter of a point. Once those transactions are exposed, they may 
no  longer take  place.  It will  certainly give the specialist,  for  the first  time, 
some knowledge of  what  is  going on  elsewhere.  We  do  know,  from  our 
experience over  the  last  two  or  three weeks,  that  there  is  a great deal  of 
business,  or a  relatively  sizable amount of  business,  taking  place on  the 
regionals  and  the  third  market.  Certainly,  in  the  more  active  New  York 
stocks,  I think  the figures  in  the  aggregate  show  that about 24  percent of 
the  total  share  volume  is  occurring  in  those  other  market  centers.  That 
probably  is  the  most  persuasive  statistic,  whatever  the  users  think,  for 310 
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to  the  regionar~ or the third  market to. obtaIn (he  prrvacy o( those markers, 
and absent that privacy vvill  directthe,r orders back  t~) tIle'  Nf'w York  StOck 
Exchange,  the  composite tape might turn  out to  bp d,sadvantageous to  the 
regiona Is  and  the  third  market.  .  .  .  .. 
The other aspect of the cOlllposite tape /s  Its tUllct/OIl as an advertising Or 
merchandising  too/.  In  going  back  and analyzing  reasons why  the  mar, 
ketplace  in  fisted  stocks  ended  up  in  Nevv  York,  a  key  element  that 
emerges,  in  addition  to  the  existence. t.here .  o~ a  well-established,  weI/_ 
capitalized specialist  s}'stern,  is  the  abd~ty at that .n.1arket  to  advertise  its 
trades visually,  on a real-time basis.  HaVIng  that abr/lty Over a long period 
of  time,  the  New  York  market  began  to  attract orders  from  all  Over  the 
country.  Those  orders  (irst  came in,  as  a  resuh  of their  correspondence, 
from  regional  firms  that  were  not  members  01  the  Nev\'  York,  but  were 
developing more and more business in  New York-listed stocks.  Ultimatel}, 
they  found  it  worthwhile  to  join  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange.  As  thaI 
market  developed,  regional  companies  that  had traditionally  been  listed 
only  on  regional  exchanges  found  that  there  were  some  benefits  to 
expOsure of their prices, and expOSure was available  onl~' on the New York 
Exchange.  The resuh Was a great efjort by corporate issuers to be listed on 
that  marketplace.  All  those  characteristics  had a  cumulative  eirect  over 
many,  man}' years of attracting corporations whose stock was being  traded 
and  brokers  who  originated  the  orders  and  of  enhanCing  the  ability  of 
capital on the floor  to  provide good markets.  This oCcurred in a framework 
of  high  competition  and was,  frankly,  one of the  main  reasons  that  New 
York developed its  premiere position. To  the  extent that  the other markets 
now have an opportunity to  become part of the tape,  it also  \'Vill  give them 
front-shelf  space  in  the  supermarket.  I think  that  it  also  gives an  aura  of 
what  we  might  call  legitimacy  to  their  trades.  There  are  enough  instiiu-
tiona I traders  here  who  recognize  that  there  is  something  about  a  New 
York  execution  that  can't really  be argued  with  in  the  Courts.  There  is  J 
presumption of best execution. There is  a public print. Because o( that print 
and the subsequent disclosure of those trades and their range and the other 
statistics  made available  later On  in  the  newspapers, people are satisfied if 
someone executes on the New  York.  That  kind of trade has a "Iegitimac( 
that trades  in other markets might  IIOt  have. I think once we all get on  the 
tape, we might see a change in  acceptance 0; a third-market Or  J  regional 
trade,  particularly  for  those  falling  outside  the  range  oi  trading  in  a 
particular market center.  You  all  know  that  if  you  send an  order into  the 
PaCific  Exchange and there has  been one price, 42  !ill,  and the quote is  42 
to 42\4 on the New  York,  if (he Pacific  ~pecidlist bids 42, which  is equal  10 Impact  of  Composite  Tape  311 
the  New  York  bid,  the  broker  will  not  make  that  trade  on  the  Pacific 
Exchange.  He will send  it on to  New York because that is where he gets an 
official print and  everybody is  satisfied. Of course,  we all  know that there 
are  split orders that attempt to deal  with that particular problem. There are 
persons and 5ystems,  such  as Comex on the Pacific  Exchange, that do it on 
or better than  the  last or the next execution in New York.  I think when we 
all  have our trades  lip there,  and  people  get  used  to  the  fact  that  those 
trades generally are equal  to one another, there will be a tendency for both 
brokers and  the  public to accept the trade  at  42 on the Pacific Exchange, 
just  as  they would accept it on  the  New York Exchange.  Therefore,  it will 
improve the order flow to regional  market  centers.  It will break the  New 
York  specialist's  ability to control  the  market.  It will tend  to  attract more 
capital,  stronger  capita!,  that  might  be  more willing to  be  continuously 
competitive to the regional exchanges than you have at  present.  Just  as you 
have relative levels of aggressiveness on the New York Exchange,  you have 
the  same  range  of capability on the various  regional  exchanges.  I  think, 
generally,  a tape  will open up  and  encourage  more capital  to come and 
assume specialist Or  market-making responsibilities. It also wili open up to 
the  regionals  the  ability  to  have  a  real  book,  a book that  provides  them 
with  opportunities  to  earn  floor  brokerage  on  limit orders. 
As  I  said  before,  the survival  of the  regional  exchanges  and  the third 
market is going to depend on their ability under this more open, competi-
tive  atmosphere  to  develop  and  to  offer  a  competitive package  of com-
munications,  access,  and  market  making. 
HELLER:  Let me begin by noting that I am a member of the SEC's Central 
Market Advisory Committee.  Whether or  not the committee will  have  an 
impact on  policy  remains  to  be  seen.  In  my view,  the  composite  tape 
functions;  at  least  it  functions  in  the  fifteen  stocks  chosen  for  its  trial 
period.  I am  able to observe it;  I am  able to tell  where a trade  has  taken 
place. I assume that if it functions with fifteen stocks and if Mr. Calvin and 
Mr. Weeden can  iron  out their differences,  it can  function with  eighteen 
hundred.  From  my  vantage  point  it  has  had  a  zero  impact.  It  is  not 
meaningful.  I  th ink the  regulatory  problems,  the  arguments  on  the short 
sale rule, can be ironed out. I think the disclosure is  positive. I think people 
are entitled to see what is taking place. There is one problem that has to  be 
addressed;  the  print on the composite tape shows the trade and  the market-
place in which it is  done but does  not show who does it. If I,  as  a regional 
specialist, sell 5,000 shares of American Telephone in New York to a buyer 
whom I meet in New York, it shows as a New York Stock Exchange trade. I 
am  not sure  that  this  is  a plus  or a minus,  but I u::  it to your  attention. 
I  think  the  real  issue  is,  Are  the  regional  stock  exchanges  going  to 
survive?  I  will address  myself to  this  mare than  to  the  tape.  I  think their / 
312  S.  Slllidl,  D.  l.  Calvin,  D.  E.  Wpl'dpn,  D.  B.  Hell(  .. 
~ 
.  I d  pends on  a single factor,  the rules and regulations unde- H,L'  L  survlva  e  (  .  I  "'"en 
the  central  market  system  will  operate.  I  think  there  are  basic,  critica 
bl  th  t h "ve to  be resolved.  For  example, doC's  the broker hav
n  pro  ems au..  _  •  " ae 
affirmative  obligation,  which  wllf  be  enf.orced  by  a  reguliltory  bod~, to 
.  I  .  n  the  best  marketplace(  I hat  IS  quesflonable  because  of  tl- execu e  I  .  I d'  .  '.  .  nr 
economics involved.  I think  thiS  pane  ISc.uSSlOn  15  '~terest'ng, but hope 
that  we  do  not  forget  about  t.he  execu:,ng  broker s  economics.  Ii  d 
brokerage  firm  can  buy  something  at.  42 V4  III  ~ew York  and  have  an 
expense structure of $10,  but can buy It  on a. rE'glOnal  stock exchange at 
42V8  and have an expense structure of $30, thiS  presents a problem to  the 
executing broker.  I  think  there  is  an  a~firmative obligation  to  accept  the 
better offer,  but we also have to recognize that il problem remains,  which 
has  to  be  looked  at  in  total  by  the  industry.  I hope  that  with  common 
clearing,  with  the  hardware  and a  system  that  will  operate effectively and 
efficiently, these economic disadvantages can be eliminated. There is some 
question as  to  who will  pay for  the system.  If the  composite tape costs a 
million  and a half dollars,  I am  curious as  to  what a composite quotation 
system might cost.  I think you havE' to look at the economics of execution. 
I think the composite tape is a forerunner of the central market system. I 
think some of the questions you might want to ask  yourself about a centrai 
market system are:  What are the characteristics that such  a system  may Or 
may  not  have?  Will  it  be a  dealer  market?  Will  it  be an  auction  market? 
Will  it  be a combination of dealer and auction markets?  These are knotty 
problems.  You  can  see  I am  taking  a  somewhat  neutral  position  on  it 
because  I think  that  classically  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  has  been 
looked  at  as  an  auction  market.  I  think  it  has  provided  viability  in  the 
system.  I think that Weeden & Company has been looked at traditionally as 
a dealer market;  it also has proved a viable part of the system. How do you 
integrate,  if  you  care  to  do  so,  two  viable  parts  of a  market  system? I 
hope the regulatory bodies will get some advice from  the Central  Market 
Advisory Committee,  but they  may act on their own, obviously, since we  are  oniy  advisory. 
I think  there is one primary objective that is  sE'rved  by  a composite tape 
and a  composite  quotation  system,  and  it  is  something  that  we  in  the 
industry  rarely  verbalize.  It  is  to  help  us  obtain  what  is  best  for  our 
customer.  I think  it  is  uninteresting to  speculate on  Whether a system  will 
be  advantageous  or  disadvantageous  to  any  member  of  the  system.  I 
believe that the viability of the industry is  enhanced if we design something 
that  helps  achieve  the  objectives  and  the  needs  of  our  customers.  The 
issues are complicated,  but I think  if  the question  is  asked,  "What is  best 
for  the customer?" and the system is designed to accomplish that end, the 
industry  will  remain  Viable  and  some  of those  knotty  problems will  be  resolved. Impact  of  Composite  Tape  313 
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FEUERSTEIN:  To  follow  Don  Weeden's  methodology,  I would  like to 
begin by  making a comment on  his presentation, then ask a question. The 
comment  has  to  do with  his  figure  that  the  third  market  and  regional 
volume has  been  representing 24  percent of the total.  I think it should be 
pointed  out that  there  is  a difference  in  the  way  third-market  and  stock 
exchange volumes are  computed. If Salomon  Brothers processes  100,000 , 
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.. hares of stock on the  New York Stock Exchange,  that  is  reported once a, 
'100,000 shares.  If  Weeden & Company has a  ~llyer and seller of  100,000 
shares,  that  is  reporter!  twice  on  the  composite  ta~)f',  as  a  purdlase  of 
100 000  ~hares  by  Weeden  and  then  as  a  sale  of  100,000  shares  by 
We~en. Now  this  may  sound  like  a flap  by  Don  Weeden to  inflate  his 
volume.  Interestingly  enough,  this  all  comes  about  because of  the  insis-
tence of the  New  York Stock Exchange that  Don Weeden report  his trades 
in  this  manner.  What  happened  was  that  the  NASD,  which  was  not  in 
favor  of  this  method of  reporting,  knuckled  under to  the New  York Stock 
Exchange  so  that  the  composite tape would  not  be  .delaye~. So  I think  if 
you were going to  pool  our exchange volume and third-marKet volume on 
a comparable basis,  the  comparative  figure  would  be  somewhat  smaller 
than  24  percent. 
RATNER:  Isn't  the same thing true  on  a purchase and sale by the  New 
York  specialist? 
FEUERSTEIN:  No,  because the whole purpose of the auction mechanism 
is  to prevent a specialist from  having riskless  principal trades.  The purpose 
of the auction mechanism  is to allow  buyers and sellers to meet directly so 
that there are, or at  least should be,  very  rare occasions where a New York 
specialist has  both a purchaser and  seller  lined  up  in  advance.  It  is  true, 
when the specialist buys a hundred shares it  is  printed, and when he sells a 
hundred shares it  is  printed, but theoretically those two transactions should 
not  be  lined  up  in  advance. 
NEWMAN:  I would  like  to add to that, as a specialist on  the floor  of the 
New  York  Stock  Exchange.  It is  my view that  as  a specialist firm function-
ing  in  an  auction  market  it  is  not  part  of our  job to  line  up  a buyer and 
seller ahead  of time.  We  buy  from  the  seller  and  sell  to  the  buyer  only 
when  an  equivalent  public  bid  or  offer  cannot  be  obtained  in  the  mar-
ketplace. When public investors are  available  on  both sides of a potential 
trade, we  view our function  as being to  make sure the  potential buyer and 
seller meet,  but we do not  participate as a dealer in the transaction. 
WEEDEN:  I think  I heard  in  that  a  question  from  Don.  I guess  the 
question  was,  Are  your  statements accurate? Everything he  said  is  true.  In 
the  development of the  tape,  the  third  market  had  wanted,  whenever we 
had  what we  called a riskless principal transaction, to report  it  as a single 
trade.  Quite  properly,  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  said  there  is  an 
inconsistency  in  riskless  principal  trading.  The  resolution  of  the  problem 
was,  if we have  a riskless  principal  transaction,  we  would  have to  report 
both sides of  it.  I think what is  happening is that we  are not  having riskless 
principal transactions. What we do is transform them into an  agency trade, 
in. the  same way  the  block  positioner does,  where  we  confirm  plus  and 
minus an eighth, five cents, or whatever is  negotiated; then  we print it  as a 
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possibility is there to create double volume,  in  iact, we are not doing so  at 
the  present  time.  Correcting  my  figures  oi  25  percent.  I would  say  the 
third-market and regional  trade  i~  25  percent of the total  volume,  bllt the 
additional  volume  equals  33  percent  of  the  volume  that  you  vvould  be 
seeing  if  you  did  not  have  a  composite  tape. 
FEUERSTEIN:  The question I wa5 getting to is whether, from  the tape and 
the  legitimacy it  gives to  your trades and the other things you  talked about, 
you  have been able to  discern any changes at all  in  the third-market share 
of  the  volume  in  those  fifteen  stocks  since  the  test  started? 
WEEDEN:  I  do  not  think  it  has  changed.  I  think  the  only  change, 
according to  our traders,  is  that  it  has narrowed our profit margins. 
LEWIS:  Did  it  ever come up for  discussion or  is  it  now under discussion, 
whether or  not  on  the  composite tape you  can  differentiate  between  an 
agency  and  a  principal  trade? 
WEEDEN:  That  question  first  came up  in  a  disclosure  committee  that 
reported to the SEC. We decided to do  it  exactly the same way it is done in 
New York,  where there is  no differentiation between agency and principal 
trades. 
LEWIS:  It  would  bring  up,  apropos of  one of  the  observations from  the 
floor,  the question of  what is  the  true volume? Say  a trade takes  place on 
the  New  York  Stock  Exchange,  a  100,000 share  trade,  part  of  which  is 
principal. The  position  house  takes  its  long position and puts  it  right back 
on  the floor.  I wonder if this  is  misleading to  the  public as  to  what is  truly 
taking place in  the  stock? What is  the real  volume, the true transaction? 
WEEDEN:  We know  that there are a great many principal trades  taking 
place on  the  New York  Stock  Exchange.  The  specialist transaction  or  the 
floor  trader's  transaction,  where he  is  acting as  principal,  certainly  is  that, 
even  though  there  might  be a  commission  charged  on  one side.  Also  the 
block positioner's transaction,  where he  is  acting as  agent on  both sides, 
but  is  taking part  of  it  for  his  own account. The  question  did  ceme up,  :s 
there any  public purpose to  be served by  going beyond what the  tape has 
traditionally  been  showing  over  the  last  hundred  years  in  differentiating 
betWEen  public trades  and those done when a dealer is  involved?  That  is 
what you  are  really  saying,  Tom.  Should  we  show stock that  really  does 
not stay in  the marketplace, but just goes through the market, versus stock 
that  stays  in  or  creates  a  short  position?  That  same  question  came  up. 
Should  we  indicate  5hort  transactions,  short  sales?  Everyone  agreed  to 
expand the tape to include those trades in  otl'L~ rnarkets and report them in 
the  same  way  that they  have  been  reported.  Then,  ,:'hen  we all  resolve 
that  problem,  we  can  go  on  to  some  that  are  far  mere  complex. 
McQUOWN:  I have  two  questions,  one for  Don  Calvin  and  one for 
Don  Weeden.  My  question  to  Don  Calvin  is  (I  want  to  verify  this  last 
discussion),  Can  you  tell  me,  roughly,  what  percent  of  the  trades  on  the / 
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t  e  agency  tradesl  My  questIOn  0  on  ee  en  IS,  It  the  Ne\  percen  ar  - .  .  .  .  \ 
York  Stock  Exchange  specialist  were  phrrllnated  and  the  prolit  that  he 
enjoys  came  out  of  the  system,  what  would  happen  to  your  monthly 
reported  earnings?  . '.  .  ;.  . 
CALVIN:  This  gets  down  to  a  difficult  matter  of  defm.tlon,  and  It  is 
t d  By the way we measure agency trades on the New York Stoe'  controver e  .  .  ~ 
L  ur data would show that about two-thIrds of all  the  trades ar,;  Excllange,  a  -.  .' 
t  trades  that is  auction market trades, where publIC orders  ar~  agency- ype  ,  '  -
on both sides of the trade.  .  . 
McqUOWN: Does that apply, though, to the speCIalist who is not a party 
to the trade? 
CALVIN:  The  specialist would  only  be  a party to  those trades when he 
acts  as  a  broker  in  executing  the  order  from  his  book.  That  is  the 
controverted part. He is,  in fact.  when  he executes an order from the book, 
acting as agent.  not as principal,  and those trades account for  about 59 to 
62  percent of the trades.  Now,  the  balance of the trades ,,\'ould  involve a 
dealer,  a  professional  for  his  own  account,  either  on  one or  both  sides. 
FARRAR:  Do  you  distinguish  number  of  trades  from  dollar volume or 
share  volume? 
CALVIN:  We  have,  and  you  will  see  this data,  as  it will  be  included  in 
the  testimony  we  will  present to  the  SEC  next  month  at  the  commission's 
19b-3  hearings.  We  do  have  it  broken  down  by  transaction  and  dollar 
volume.  I am  not  that  good  at  numbers  to  accurately recite  it  to  you,  but 
you  will  see.  I was  talking  about transactions. The dollar-volume amounts? 
The  percentages  obviously  are  different,  but the  relationship  is  obviously 
the  same.  It  is  pretty  much  the  same. 
WEEDEN:  If you are saying our volume is overstated, i will  have to keep 
that  in  mind  when  we  negotiate  who  is  going  to  pay  the  cost. 
CALVIN:  I am  not  talking  about  your  volume  at  all.  Mr.  McQuown's 
question was about NYSE  volume.  In  terms of your volume,  I am glad you 
brought that up,  because I did want to talk about it.  On the test tape for the 
first  ten  days,  from  October  18  to  November  1,  it  is  interesting  that the 
third-market  volume  in  those  fifteen  slacks  accounted for  6.2  percent  in 
terms  of  shares,  and  4.4  percent  in  terms  of  transactions.  Share  volume 
probably  is  not a fair  measure;  a measure of transactions would probablv 
be more accurate.  I would assume, from what Don said earlier, that only a 
part of those  percentages in fact  represent dealer trades because you were 
saying you are doing those stocks  as  agency trades,  rather than as  riskless 
principal  trading. 
WEEDEN:  My own experience is that the volume  YOll are seeing thereil 
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CALVIN:  It  is  interesting  just  by  way  of  information,  and  probably 
nothing  more  than  that,  to  observe  that  in  terms  of transactions  during 
these eleven days, the Midwest Stock Exchange accounted for 7.9 percent; 
the  third  market,  the  over-the-counter  market,  4.4  percent;  the  Pacific 
Exchange,  5.5 percent;  and  the PBW, 3.6 percent. That  is the way it breaks 
down. 
WEEDEN:  Mac had  one  other question,  on  separating our commission 
revenue  from  our dealer revenue.  All I can  say  is that we had  hoped  the 
Wells Fargo group, along with the  University of Chicago,  would come in 
and design a program that would have allowed us to  break that down into 
two separate  groups.  I would have  to say  that most of our profit is  derived 
from  dealer  spreads,  although  the  other  variable,  in  these  very  volatile 
markets,  is  the  market  appreciation  or depreciation  that  you  get  on  your 
inventories. I would say that in these markets probably most of your profit, 
or lack of profit, comes not from spread or from brokerage but from having 
made a good or bad decision on whether to take on a dealer commitment. 
McqUOWN:  Don,  the  thing  I  am  interested  in  is,  If  the  New York 
specialist's  spread  were  zero,  would  that  imply  that  the  competitors' 
market  spread  also  wDu!d  have  to  be  zero? 
WEEDEN:  That  is  a theoretical question  that I would have great difficulty 
answering because, thank God, it is  not zero. To the  extent that they were 
working for nothing in a competitive marketplace, we would have to do so 
too  in  order  to  remain  competitive.  If  we  could get  up to  the  point of 
working for nothing, we would be way ahead  of what Our  last two years' 
experience  has  been. 
RICKERSHAUSER:  The  last  point  made  me  want  to  say  something 
specific. One of the  competitive aspects  the  Pacific has  provided  is  that  it 
does cashiering and  accounting for its specialists at  a flat  monthly rate.  A 
Pacific specialist could  in  fact have a zero spread at  a particular time and 
not  actuaily  lose  money in  terms  of his  back-office charges.  Most others 
have  a  cost  with  each  trade,  specifically  assigned  to that  trade,  so  they 
actually lose  money on a zero spread. That is just one example of some of 
the  kinds of things that  happen  when you  have a group of minds working 
on  these  problems. 
The  question  I  want  to  ask  is ...  We happen  to  have  the  luxury  of 
having  a  number  of  people  here  who  are  in  the  "real  world,"  and  I 
distinguish them  from  those in  the  legal  profession  or those who work for 
the government or for universities, whom I define as  being not in the  real 
world.  I  am  interested  in  knowing whether  anyone  who  is  in  the  real 
world of trading has formed an  opinion, after twelve, fourteen, or eighteen 
days  of operation,  about  what  a  composite  tape  is  like!y  to  do  to  the 
smaller  marketplaces?  I  just wondered  if anybody in  the  business  ha!;  an l/  •  ,  .' 
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.  .  n  as  t()  \"hich  set  of  arguments,  thosp  against  or  thos('  fl)r  th  I  Impresslo  ,  ,  •.  .  .  .  'l  I 
common  tapes,  \Vould  prevail.  . 
IRElAND:  The  first  two or  three days attN tilt'  t,1111'  "tMtccl,  I madly  hit 
the buttulIevt'ry time I saw a  third-ma.r~et trade to set' wlwther Don  was a 
buyer or seller by  the way his  price~ (lltiered  f~orn those on the  last sales in 
New  York.  That has gotten  r,lther trresonw.  RIght  now, I really do  not  pal 
that  much  attention  to  it. 
RICKERSHAUSER:  Docs it  have any impa.ct on  your feeling regarding the 
legitimacy  of  the  trade?  Docs  it  ha~e any  Impact on your  desire  to order 
your broker to do business  in  a partICular market center because now  it  is 
printed  in  full  public  vie\-v? 
IRELAND:  I have  no  response to  that.  I have not done anything more Or 
less  than  I did  before  the  romposite  tape  began  its  trial  phase. 
STOLl:  In the academic world vve  havE"  a theoretical construct called the 
random walk, which says  that past prices do not  n1altt'r.  that what you  are 
concerned about  is  the  next price.  In  that  kind  of  world,  a  transactiom_ 
reporting tape would be of very  little importance. \lVhat  is important wouid 
be  the composite quotation  system,  because that  tells  you  the  prices  you 
will  be able to  get or could have gotten, depending upon how good those 
quotes  are.  It  would  be  the  only  effee-tive  adve'rtising  mechanism. 
WEEDEN:  I think there have been a couple of times when we have been 
very  active  in  a stock,  I think  First  National  City  Bank.  We  feel  we haw 
gotten  calls,  having put on some larger blocks of  stock,  from  people that 
we  would  not  have  gotten  calls  from  han  it  not  been advertised  on  the 
tape.  From  our  experiences  with  thme  people,  !  think,  frankly,  we  are 
surprised  that  we  are  not  getting  more  calls  because  of  what  we  are 
advertising  on  the  tape. 
STOLL:  That means,  I assume, that the tape serve's as a surrogate forthe 
quotation  system.  It  means,  "We  make  markets.  VVe  do  not  have  a 
composite  quotation  system,  but  if  there  is  SOl1)('  way  to  tell  people  we 
have  done  it  in  the  past,  they  may  presume  we  will  do it  now." 
WEEDEN:  Yes,  someone  will  come  in  and  say,  "Was that  you  who 
printed the City Corps,  and what is  your ax to  grind now because I have an 
interest.'! 
CALVIN:  But  isn't it true  that your quotes art' on NASDAQ or AulEx.  so 
your  quotes  are  being  advertised  to  that  extent? 
WEEDEN:  Our offerings and size arc on AutEx.  NASDAQ's only purpose 
was  to  expose  to  the  member  firms  their  responsibility  to  go  to  the  best 
market.  To  the  extent  we  had  b€!ter  quotes  than  New  York,  which  thf'~ 
were  getting supposedly  in  the same area, they would feel  some sense of 
responsibility  to  come  and  find  out  how  big  our  bid  or  ofiering  was. 
Unfortunately,  the  member  firm  community  has  managed  to  ignore that 
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CALVIN: The answer to my question is  yes,  for the record.  I think when 
you  get  into  discussion  of the  composite  quote  I  would offer  the  same 
comment I offered at the d'")>;e  of my rpmiHk<; rpgarding the composite tape. 
I think it is questionable and arguable, at  least, that this will prove to be an 
advantage  for  the  regional  markets  and  the  third  market. 
I would like to say  one thing here that  is  related  but  unrelated; that  is, 
I would  like to  align  myself with  remarks  by both  Dave  Heller and  Don 
Weeden that what needs to be  focused on here is the economics that exist 
today when you talk about a central markei system or tape or quote system 
tomorrow.  I  do  not  think  that  the  debate over  whether  there  should  or 
should  not be  a central  market system  is  realistic.  I think the  real  issue  is 
whether this should be an  auction market type of system or a dealer market 
type  of  system.  What  exists  today  is  that  the  third  market  is  really  an 
adjunct to the auction market system that exists on the exchanges. I think if 
there were assurances to the community-this is  the general industry view 
at  least-that there would continue to be an  auction  market,  there  would 
be  much greater acceptance of the overall concept. What it  gets  down to, 
in the impact on the regional exchanges in these areas,  is the economics of 
the busi ness,  that is to say, the willingness of broker-dealers to assume  risk. 
Market makers  are  market makers  only because  they are  risk  takers,  and 
they  assume  risks  only  in  anticipation  of  potential  profits. 
Just to rebut some  of the things that were said  this morning about lack of 
competition: anyone who has spent any time 011 the floor of the New York 
Stock  Exchange  and  does  not  think  there  is  competition  there  is  sadly 
mistaken.  There  is  competition down there continually. Those  people risk 
their capital every day. They are  directly affected by it. It is  not something 
that artificial barriers created; they have very strong incentives to compete. 
Now the  regional exchanges and  the third  market can  only improve their 
position, to the extent that they are willing to  assume  comparable risk,  by 
making markets  in  a  competitive way-which translates  into  better  mar-
kets.  To  do that,  they  have  a chicken  and  egg  sort  of proposition.  They 
argue  that they would be  willing and  able to make  better markets  if they 
could attract the flow of orders. Unless they do attract the flow of orders, 
however,  they  are  not  willing to  make  those  markets,  because  the  risk 
taking  required  in  order to  do so  is  much  greater  than  reasonable  men 
would assume.  But  you have  to remember a point that  Dave made when 
he  questioned  what  regulation  would  be  imposed.  He  posed  that  as  a 
question with respect  to the  future  viability of the  regionals.  I think you 
have to assume that there is going to be greater regulation of the specialists 
on the  regional exchanges than there  is  today.  If that  means that they are 
going to be  less  competitive as  a result,  then they are  in trouble. What it 
gets down to  is the incentives they have for taking a risk to attract the flow 
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these devices  will  do  it  any  more than  the  so-called arbitrary restrictions 
~.  we talked about this  morning do it today to make  it  happen  in  New 
York.  Rule  394 does  not  make  it  happen.  It  is  the  competitive  markets 
made  there  that  attract  trades  to  the  New  York  floor. 
HELLER: Mr.  Calvin and I are in total disagreement;  you simply cannot 
be a market maker unless you have inquiry.  If inquiry comes because the 
broker-l am talking about the retail  broker-finds it  more economical to 
do business on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange than the regional 
. stock exchange,  he will sacrifice execution tor economy. The problem is a 
chicken and  egg  problem,  which  I am  hopeful  the  regulatory authorities 
will resolve by requiring--as eventually they must require-that where the 
best  bid  or clfer  exists  is  where  the  execution  will  take  place.  I am  a 
regional specialist, and my cry is that I am absolutely willing to have equal 
regulation,  equal capital  requirements;  but we  are going to  have  to have 
equality in  terms of our ability to attract inquiry as well.  Equality  in terms 
of inquiry is to me just a very simple matter of enforcement.  If I make the 
best bid or have the best offer,  then I should be hit at either the bid or the 
offering. If Oon Weeden has the best bid or the best offer, he should be hit. 
It cannot be that you make the best bid, and you find that your competitor 
is  buying  the  stock  an  eighth  below  your  bid;  or  you  find  out  that 
economically, as a market  maler, you  have to go to  New York and selJ 
100,000 or  150,000 shares a day because you do not  have the  inquiry, 
because the  inquiry  i5  not forced. 
I do not accept the argument that feIional specialists will  be weakened 
by a composite r;uotation system. QuitE" to the contrary, I think I am being 
presumptuous, but we welcome it ~  long as it is enforced that the best bid 
or the best otfering must be 5efViced. At that point, you get true competition 
between  rnadcet  maIcers.  This includes,  obviously,  that  if  Don Weeden's 
firm, or any other thiad-matbt firm, provides the best bid or the best 1ffer, 
thev  too will  attract the resulting order flows. 
ROWEN:  Would it be economical for a Chk:ago broker to go to  New 
York  instead  d  the Midwest  Stock  Exchang!l 
HEWR: You  gee that as the problem, but it is not One of the  reasons 
that  you  have  90 to 95  percelll of the  volume  on  the  Midwest  Stock 
Exchanp done .,. duaf members who are New  York and Midwest mem-
bers  is because it is more economicai 10 do it that way_  Unless you  iron 
out the economics, or aequite execution ..  the best bid or offering,  ~ 
never  wifl  III the  full  benefits  01  competition between  market  makers, 
because ,.,... dileRnces  in executian costs  are  astronomical. 
MENDELSON:  The c:hidIen and ..  problem is that  there  will  be  no 
inaelud tewoUnquirieiancl 0IdIn to ........  unless the reaioNJs 
~  .  ....,  ........ -_  cannot male beeler markets unless they _ 
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that  David  Heller  just  mentioned.  All  the wire houses,  for  example,  route 
their  orders  automatically.  It  is  just  too  expensive  to  send  them  to  a 
regional  exchange  rather  than  to  thE'  N€'w  York  Stock  Exchange.  The 
consolidated  tape  by  itself  is  not  going  to  do a  thing  about  it.  There  is 
nothing  that  has  been said,  that  I can see,  thai  would  make  the consoli-
dated tape hurt the regionals,  but then neither has anything been said, that 
I can  see,  that would  help the  regionals  much.  Mr.  Heller  said  that  you 
have to have a sort of  price priority. There are two things wrong with that. 
First, a consolidated tape does not tell you where the best market is.  It  only 
tells  you  what  the  last  execution  was.  We  need  at  least  a  consolidated 
quotation  system  to  determine  where the  best  market  is  on  a  real-ti me 
basis. Second, even with consolidated quotations you  will  have a very  real 
problem  for  a  very  large  part  of  the  industry.  It  is  true  that  a  small 
brokerage firm  can examine the CRT (cathode ray tube) display, determine 
which is the best market, and can pick up the phone and direct his order to 
any market he wants;  but the staff  of  a major wire house that  is  handling 
thousands and thousands of orders daily  just  cannot stop to consider each 
particular  order,  carefully  examine  the  array  of  prices,  and  determine 
which is the best one. They need a more automatic or automated system to 
handle that kind  of order flow.  I think the industry is  just going to  ask for 
trouble if it expects the individual firm to develop the kind of system that will 
at  all  times route orders to the "best" marketplace on  a price basis, when 
NASDAQ can provide such a system for all firms si multaneously at very little 
extra  cost. 
WEEDEN:  I just want to add to what  Dave said  about the best  bid  and 
best offering.  In  the real  world, sometimes in  those volatile markets where 
we are the best  bid  or thE  best offering,  we wonder what somebody else 
knows that we do not  know.  We wish that we had a chance to  reconsider 
our bid  or offering.  I disagree with  Dave,  however, when he says that one 
of our first  priorities should be to try to equate the costs in all  marketplaces. 
I think  that  the  different  marketplaces  are  trying  to  compete  in  terms  of 
providing lowest cost.  Lowest  cost can be thought of as having two  parts. 
One is lowest cost to the public. I think we all are agreed, to the extent we 
are moving toward a central market system, that wherever the best price is 
for the customer, that ought to be where the trade is executed. There is also 
best cost from  the standpoint of the broker,  however.  I think that  is  where 
we  are  all  going  to  be  actively  competing,  trying  to  improve  the  cost 
connected with  executing in  our market vis-a-vis somebody else's market. 
Those costs are clearing costs. One of the things that thE' Midwest has been 
very successful at, everything else being equai, is  maintaining a lower cost 
of execution for  their members,  who also are members of  New York,  than 
the New  York  Exchange does.  Absent a better market  in  New  York,  much 
of  their  members'  business  is  done  in  Chicago  on  the  basis  of  better 322 
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clearing.  I think another cost  is  the cost of floor  hr~'kerag0. To  the  extl'rr 
that we muve to a fully  negotiated rate structure, I thl.nk there is going to ~ 
active  competition  among  various  market  cpnters  In  order to  reduce  a' 
much  as  possible  the  floor  brokerage  cost  connect£'d  with  using  th~: 
market.  I think,  in  turn,  that  if  the competition is  allowed to operate in a 
free  and  fully  accessible  market,  '.vith  each market center fully  accessible 
to everybody, then you will see those costs come down. That is going to be 
both  in  the  public's  interest  and  the  broker's  interest. 
FARRAR:  I would  like  to  inquire  of  Don  Weeden,  Dave  Heller,  and 
perhaps others,  Bob  Newman,  for .exampl:,  abollt  the  extent  to  which a 
composite tape does,  by  itself, prowie a fairly close surrogate for compos. 
ite quotations.  To what extent can an experienced trader,  keeping  his eye 
on  the  tape,  essentially  impute  the  prices that  would  be  distributed  by a 
composite  quotation  system,  if  such a  system  were  developed?  To  what 
extent does the composite tape,  with  unfixed  rates and  perhaps other rult 
changes  to  facilitate  access  by  outsiders  to  exchange  markets  (and  vice 
versa),  provide a fairly  close approximation of  the central  market  system 
that  would  exist  if  composite  quotations  also  were  in  place? 
HELLER:  Let me reply  if I can. I do not think that a composite tape which 
shows what  has transpired in the real world means anything, because what 
has  transpired changes very quickly as  another buyer or seller comes into 
the  market,  say,  or  a  piece  of  news  breaks.  It  does  not  show.  at  that 
particular point  in  time,  whether the  bid  or  the  offer has expired, which I 
will  assume  to  be  an  agency  bid  or  offering.  It  does  not  reveal  whether 
Don  Weeden's  firm  has  extinguished  its  buying  Oi  selling  interest  as 
principal  at  that  price.  It does not  tell  us  whether Bob  Newman's firm,  or 
my  firm,  has extinguished its  buying or selling at that price. Thereiore, asa 
participant in the composite tape and an  observer of  it on a six-hour daY,1 
do  not  feel  it  has  much  significance;  but  a  quotation  system  will! 
SMIDT:  Dave, ! watched you trade for  an  hour or so,  and I could not get 
you  to  take  your  eye  off the tape  for  more  than  a fe\-\'  seconds at a time. 
Whether  it  was  a composite  tape  or  not,  clearly  it  contained  important 
information  for  you. 
HElLER:  The only reason  it is  important,  and I will  take my cheap shot 
right  now,  is  because on  a regional  exchange  WP  arE'  not  allowed,  even 
being New  York  members,  to  know  what the  bid  and ask  is  in  the other 
marketpiace. Therefore,  you  look at  it  as a very poor indication of what  is 
taking place elsewhere in the stock. 
LEWIS:  A real-world  nuts  and  bolts  question  to  any  member  of  the 
committee as to what response, positive or negative, you have had from the 
press regarding reporting in  the daily papers of the new volume. 
WEEDEN:  I guess I know as much about that as anybody. I would say, al 
the  present time,  the newspapers are  indicating that  they  do  not  want  to 
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'1  change,  even with composit(' information iwailable. I think it is probably a 
I€  lack of understanding of what will be refluired. I think the newspaper<;'  first 
IS  interest,  again,  is  the  broker's  intere<;t  in  cost.  I  think  they  ieel they  will 
It  have to use  a lot more space  in reporting all  the composite tape  activity: 
a  they  will have to show it in separate columns, or they will have  to separate 
E'  it out and have information from all marketplaces. They  are adamant about 
~  not using any more iree space in their newspapers. I think, if it is explained 
that composite information wiil be more valuable to the public, show mOre 
oi the volume and the accurate range that took place in all the markets, that 
it will take  no more  space  than  what they  had  for New York  information 
only,  they will come around to recognizing that it is  no more trouble and 
would  be  of  greater  publ ic  interest.  I  wanted  to  answer  Don  Farrar's 
question also.  I think that once YOll  get  a composite tape,  there is  a good 
chance  that  what we had  hoped would happen  by  putiing our quotation 
on  NASDAQ but did not, will happen. Say  we buy a block of stock at  41 
when  the  last  sale  in  New York was 42,  and  brokers  continue to send  buy 
orders  to  New  York  and  get  executions  at  42.  We,  having  bought  that 
block as principal, will begin to show trades at  41 V4  or 41  ~/2. I think it will 
not be  long before  customers of Merrill  Lynch,  Bache,  or whomever are 
going to say,  "Look, we would appreciate it if you would go  and exp!ore 
that market and  see  if you could have gotten us a better price." I think that 
slowly but surely the composite tape is  going to impose a responsibility on 
brokers  to  get  best  execution  in  listed  stocks  that  are  traded  over  the 
counter  as  well,  a  responsibility  member  brokers  have  up  to  now  adi1-
mantly  refused  to recognize. 
CALVIN: May I ask  Mr. Weeden  a question? Do you feel  that your firm 
has  that  responsibility  !for  best  execution\  today? 
WEEDEN: Our firm does not operate as  a broker; we operate as  a dealer. 
We have an arm's length  relationship. It is  Our  customer,  whether it is an 
institution  or whether it is  a broker, who determines whether or  not  the 
price  that  we  are  offering  or bidding  is  the  best  available.  I  know that 
sometimes  we say  we think we  are  not competitive.  We  might have too 
much  of that  stock,  and  we  say,  "Donny  Stone  is  a good  market  maker. 
Why  Jon't  you  try  the  floor  of the  exchange?" 
CALVIN: You are drawing a distinction, then, in terms of best execution, 
that does not apply to a firm that acts as  a dealer. Do you  assert that there 
is no responsibility to seek out a belter market if you are acting as  a dealer 
in  that  stock?  Is  that  what  you  are  saying? 
WEEDEN:  If a cllstomer wants to give us  an  order and  asks  us  to act  as 
his agent, we will be happy to go  anywhere in order to find the best price. 
We would even  go onto the floor of the  exchange;  but unfortunately, we 
could not continue our established  business  if we coulcl  :-;v[ also  conduct 
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CALVIN:  But then you are changing what I think you  said  earlier.  You 
do feel that you have a best-execution t)'pe responsibility, even though  YOU 
are  acting  as  a dealer? 
WEEDEN:  No. I said that if they w.::.:-,i to give us an order and ask us to act as 
their agent,  we  have a best-execution  responsibility. 
CAL VIN:  What  about  when  you  are  acting  as  a  dealer? 
WEEDEN;  No,  in  that  capacity  we  make  a market.  We  have  no  more 
responsibility than does my good friend  Robert  [Newman)  here to explore 
other  markets  before  he  executes  in  his  own  market. 
CALVIN:  The only reason  I raise  this  is  that  there are  a lot  of respon-
sibilities. One possibility that is a continuing concern in  this whole area  is 
that present firms,  which act principally as agents or as brokers, will under 
a  regime  of  competitive  rates  act  principally  as  dealers.  If  that  does 
happen, and  if  they lack a responsibility to take an order or shift the order 
around, as  Don  is  saying they  may,  then  you  have a question as to what 
has  been  accomplished  in  terms  of  finding  a  better  execution  for  the 
customer. In other words,  it would seem under those circumstances, which 
I do  not  know  to  be a fact,  that  the  responsibility  then  falls  back  to the 
customer,  not  the  dealer.  to  seek  out  best  execution. 
WEEDEN:  I am glad you brought that up, Don, because I do think that is 
a problem. I think when a customer comes in to a broker, intending to ask 
him  to act  in  his  best interests as an agent,  and then finds out that he did 
not  in fact act as a broker, but as a dealer on the other side--even though 
that  is  somehow  revealed  to  him  after  the  fact  by  a  confirmation  that 
comes in and has  in  small  print down  in  the corner that he acted in this 
case as a dealer-then the customer may justifiably wonder whether or not 
he has obtained "best e)(ecution." I believe that a " broker' , has a responsi-
bility,  before  he  acts  as  a  dealer,  to  explore  the  other  markets  to  see 
whether or  not  his  customer  can  do better there. 
CAL VIN:  That begs the question a bit. In other words, the firms could get 
around him.  If this  is  the status of the law-and I do not know that it is or 
will be-and the best-execution responsibility does not carry to a dealer, a 
firm  could avoid that problem by advising the customer, well  in advance, 
that  it  is  dCting  as  a dealer, and advise the  customer otherwise when  it 
decides not to do so.  That  is essentially what you  are saying you do. This 
again  poses  a  basic  question  before  the  house  regarding  what  we  are 
talking about when we refer to a central market, a national market system, 
or  whatever.  In  terms  of  these  responsibilities,  are  we  talking  about  a 
system  that  will  become  primarily  a  dealer-oriented  system  or  will  it 
continue to  be primarily an auction-oriented systeml Now if it is one and 
not  the other,  then  the  whole scenario changes.  If it  becomes a dealer-
oriented system,  it  then  seems  reasonably clear that  it is gains to be very 
difficult to achieve many  of the objectives that people describe as noble 
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difierently than agents.  That  IS  basic.  How  you  can  tie  dea lers  together is 
one  matter.  ThE"  ha~ir  problem  we  have  had  in  discussions  over  the 
composite tape and over the central market system  has been, How do you 
integrate  third-market  dealer  activity  into  the  existing  exchange  system? 
There  are  basic  dissimilarities,  and that has  always  been  the tough  prob-
lem.  I remember we went back and met with the SEC on  this  in  December 
1971  when  we first  thought we had an  agreement on  the composite tape; 
the  commission  said,  "fine  and  good.  Now,  how  are  you  going  to 
integrate the third  market into what you  are proposing here?" We said that 
was a question  we would  address  ourselves to,  and  I said  we would  get 
back  to  it  next  month,  and  we have  never  really  gotten  back  to  it. 
JENKINS:  There was a discussion earlier suggesting that the tape will  not 
be  coming  on  line  as  scheduled.  I would  like  to  ask  Don  Weeden  if  he 
could give  his  best estimate as  to  preCisely  when,  if  not  in  February,  this 
tape  will  become fully  operational? 
WEEDEN:  As  far  as  I know,  February  21. 
JENKINS:  But  YOLI  should  say  in  all  fairness,  though,  "at this  point  in 
time." 
CALVIN:  I agree with that. As  I understand, "at this point in time," there 
are  problems  which  may  require  either  a  delay  in  that  date  or  some 
modification of the original full  implementation proposal as envisioned by 
the  plan. 
WEEDEN:  I think there is  always a possibility that something might blow 
up, people are not able to do the programming or the testing in  time;  but at 
this time, despite the increasing closeness of that date and the many  things 
still  to  be  done, the Composite Tape Association  is  cooperatively making 
an  effort  to  meet  the  target  date.
1 
FEUERSTEIN:  We have  been  discussing  the  possibility  that  brokers  in 
whom customers were reposing trust and confidence to find  best execution 
might seek to  shi rk  that responsibility  by  calling themselves dealers rather 
than  agents.  In  this  regard,  I  think  it  might  be  instructive  to  note  the 
suggestion that in the formulation of Rule 113, there was a mix-up between 
the  Amex  investigation,  which  basically  involved  abuses  committed  by 
specialists handling "not held orders" for  individuals, and the implementa-
tion  of  Rule  113, which  precluded specialists  from  dealing  directly  with 
institutions. Perhaps a solution to the problem we are discussing would be 
to set things right and  reverse Rule 113, making it illegal for specialists and 
other market makers to deal directly with individuals, rather than making it 
illegal  for  them  to  deal  directly  with  institutions. 
NOTE 
1.  In fact, the February  21  target date was not met. The composite tape began full operation 
June  16,  1975.-ED. 